The Greenspan Put and the Yellen Call

In today's Guardian, I make the case for a more aggressive financial stabilization policy,  "No more boom and bust? The financial policy committee has time on its side". I argue that the Bank of England's FPC should buy shares in the stock market when the PE ratio is low, and sell them when it is high.

Kimdriver makes the following comment.
The Greenspan put with real teeth ?
My worry is that, while CAPE has historically been a good predictor of future returns, the level that the FPC should be ready to intervene would have to be set so low that it might be fairly useless. Otherwise the safety net would just encourage increased irrational exuberance.
My response ...
I am not arguing just for a Greenspan Put: but also for a Yellen Call. It is just as dangerous to allow market bubbles as it is to allow them to crash.
Read more here...

Why Death Matters for Central Bank Policy

Noah Smith raises the question: can the Fed influence the interest rate? Although the answer may seem obvious, the question itself reflects a conundrum for neoclassical theory. It is representative of a related but more comprehensive question: does the asset composition of the central bank balance sheet matter?

Let me set aside, for now, the deep question: what is money? I will take for granted the fact that the liabilities of the central bank are special. Perhaps this is due to legal restrictions, as Neil Wallace has suggested, or perhaps it is a matter of social convention. My focus here is not on central bank liabilities; but on their assets.

Figure 1
Figure 1 is a stylized representation of the balance sheet  of the Fed. Like King Midas who turned everything he touched to gold, so the Fed turns everything it purchases into money. Commercial banks hold accounts at the Fed, and when the Fed purchases an asset, any asset, those accounts are credited with the creation of new money.

Historically, the asset composition of the Fed has consisted almost exclusively of short term Federal government bonds, the item in red on Figure 1. In September of 2008 two things happened. First, the size of the balance sheet increased. The RHS of the table in Figure 1 went from $800b to $2,000b overnight. Second, the composition of the asset portfolio changed dramatically.
Figure 2
Figure 2 is a highly stylized representation of what happened following the collapse of Lehman Brothers in the fall of 2008.  The Fed purchased a whole boatload of long-term government debt: And for the first time in its history, it bought mortgage backed securities (MBS). 

The fact that the asset side of the balance sheet went from $800b to $2,000b is referred to as quantitative easing. The fact that the fraction of liabilities held as short term treasury securities went from 94% (750/800) to 38% (750/2000) is referred to as qualitative easing.

Here's the puzzle for neoclassical theory. According to received wisdom (Michael Woodford's Jackson Hole paper is an excellent exposition of this idea) the asset composition of the Fed's balance sheet is irrelevant. If the Fed had bought more short-term government debt instead of intervening in the riskier MBS market; it would not have made one whit of difference to the economy.

Why is that? According to standard neoclassical models, all transactions are carried out by infinitely lived families who take into account the welfare of their descendants. The far sighted paternalistic patriarchs of these families trade assets with each other that are contingent on every possible future event.  

Because the price of long bonds reflects all known facts about the probabilities of future outcomes, central bank asset positions do not influence the market price of risk. When the government takes a new position in the asset markets, the private sector unwinds that position through its own open-market trades.

But that is not what happened. A wealth of evidence shows not just that quantitative easing matters, but also that qualitative easing matters. (see for example Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen, Hamilton and Wu, Gagnon et al). In other words, QE works in practice but not in theory. Perhaps its time to jettison the theory.

Replacing all of neoclassical theory with an operational alternative is a daunting task. There is no lack of contenders. Perhaps people are irrational as the behaviorists have claimed. Perhaps the market is segmented and institutional constraints cause pension funds to favor safe assets. Perhaps there are borrowing constraints that prevent some trades from taking place. These are all possibilities and I do not want to suggest that they do not have merit. But there is a much simpler explanation for the failure of the irrelevance result. Human beings do not live forever.

The fact that our lives are finite has consequences for the efficiency of asset markets. Davis Cass and Karl Shell called this idea sunspots. Asset markets are volatile because we all, eventually, meet the grim reaper. And although governments are sometimes overturned, they have much longer horizons than individuals. That simple fact explains why the asset composition of the central bank matters.

A Systemic Explanation for The 2008 Financial Crisis

In September of 2013, Francis Breedon organized a Round Table discussion at the Money Macro Finance Conference held at Queen Mary College London. The session included myself, Chris Giles of the Financial Times and David Miles of the Monetary Policy Committee as speakers and Sushil Wadwhani as moderator.  Our topic: the Bank of England's remit.

Chris and David chose to speak about monetary policy and the role of the Monetary Policy Committee.  I chose, instead, to focus on the task that faces the newly formed Bank of England's  Financial Policy Committee.  This post will focus on one of the points I made in my talk, the distinction between what I call institutional and systemic explanations of the 2008 financial crisis.  My complete argument is published in a forthcoming paper "Financial Stability and the Role of the Financial Policy Committee", that will appear in The Manchester School.

Recent events have generated widespread consensus that the financial markets are not working as they should. But there is little agreement as to why. One explanation is that financial frictions can sometimes become more disruptive than usual and these frictions can be corrected by regulating financial institutions. An alternative explanation that I have promoted in my own work, is that financial markets do not allocate capital efficiently.  The failure of financial markets occurs because people who will be born in the future cannot trade in current markets. I call this the absence of prenatal financial markets.

The financial frictions view leads to an institutional explanation for financial crises. The absence of prenatal financial markets view leads to the systemic explanation. Quoting from my forthcoming paper...
Distinguishing the institutional from the systemic explanation of financial crises affects the way we respond. If the problem is institutional we should design regulations that help overcome the financial frictions that prevent our banks, insurance companies and pension funds from performing their appropriate roles as intermediaries. If the problem is systemic, the failure of institutions is a symptom and new regulations are analogous to putting an Elastoplast on a gunshot wound.
The consensus amongst economists in the U.K. and the U.S. is that the 2008 financial crisis that led to the Great Recession was an institutional failure. The response has been the passage of the Financial Services Act in the U.K. and the Dodd‐Frank Act in the U.S.; legislation that is designed to regulate the financial services industry. I believe that the consensus is mistaken; the problem is not institutional; it is systemic.
Let me be clear. I am not arguing that existing financial institutions were blameless. Nor am I arguing that the regulatory framework was effective. The crisis has taught us that the design of effective regulation matters: and it matters a lot. I agree wholeheartedly with Anat Admati and Martin Hellwig who argue forcefully that we need much higher capital requirements. Regulating existing institutions is necessary: but we can and should do much more. Quoting again from my forthcoming paper...
... If I am right, and the problem is systemic, regulating our existing institutions will not solve the problem [of preventing future financial crises]. It will lead to the creation of new institutions, shadow‐banks, shadow insurance companies and shadow pension funds; unregulated institutions that will be created to facilitate the trades that willing lenders and willing borrowers want to engage in. Dodd‐Frank and the Financial Services Act cannot prevent the next financial crisis any more than King Canute could prevent the movement of the tides.
...When the next financial crisis occurs, and it will occur, do not blame the members of the Financial Policy Committee. They are guard dogs without teeth. It’s time to move beyond empty rhetoric by giving to the FPC, the tools that will enable it to deliver what is requested of it. If we truly want financial stability; we must act to stabilise markets. 
If you want to read more, you will find a working paper version of the article here where I also explain what tools we should give to the FPC to maintain future financial stability.

Animal Spirits: an Empirical Test

Christian Zimmerman draws attention to a new paper by Paolo Gelain and Marco Guerrazi, "A demand-driven search model with self-fulfilling expectations: The new ‘Farmerian’ framework under scrutiny" 

Here is the abstract from the paper
In this paper, we implement Bayesian econometric techniques to analyze a theoretical framework built along the lines of Farmer’s micro-foundation of the General Theory. Specifically, we test the ability of a demand-driven search model with self-fulfilling expectations to match the behaviour of the US economy over the last thirty years. The main findings of our empirical investigation are the following. First, all over the period, our model fits data very well. Second, demand shocks are the most relevant in explaining the variability of concerned variables. In addition, our estimates reveal that a large negative demand shock caused the Great Recession via a sudden drop of confidence. Overall, those results are consistent with the main features of the New ‘Farmerian’ Economics as well as to latest demand-side explanations of the finance-induced recession.
In Christian's words...
Roger Farmer’s recent work has been causing quite a stir, especially as it seems to validate some the things that happened during the recent crisis. This paper provides an empirical test of Farmer’s theory and shows that he is indeed onto something.
Christian's website was set up to promote discussion of research on DSGE models and he invites visitors to leave comments on the papers he highlights. Thanks Christian, for drawing attention to this very interesting piece.

New Keynesian Flimflam

Simon Wren-Lewis, seeks a serious debate with our heterodox colleagues, and judging by the excellent comment thread that appears on his post, there are plenty of heterodox economists who are ready and willing to take up the challenge. This is a welcome debate.

Simon defends his view of orthodoxy, by which he means New Keynesian economics. In its simplest form, New Keynesian economics is a three-equation model that explains the behavior of the nominal interest rate, the "output gap" and the inflation rate.

I agree firmly with Simon, that from a policy perspective, we should not care one iota if NK economics has anything to do with what Keynes might or might not have thought. But from the perspective of the history of thought, we should not mislead our students with false labels. The New Keynesian model is neither new nor Keynesian. It is a beautiful formalization of David Hume's verbal argument in his 1742 essay "Of Money"; an early piece on the Quantity Theory of Money  that every macroeconomics student should read at least once.

Let me take up just one point from Simon's post. Are the demand and supply of labor always equal and should we care?

In the NK model, the answer to this question is YES: the demand and supply of labor are always equal. There is no involuntary unemployment as defined in the General Theory. Why does that matter?

The notion of continuous market clearing adds a mechanism to the NK model that works to restore full employment through wage and price adjustment. That mechanism is the basis for the NK Phillips curve which asserts that prices will rise whenever output is above potential. Since potential output cannot be independently measured, that assertion becomes a tautological definition of the output gap.

The NK economist accepts Milton Friedman's concept of the natural rate of unemployment which asserts that, in the long run, there is a unique equilibrium level of unemployment associated with stable inflationary expectations. If inflation appears, following a recession, a policy maker who accepts NK economics will infer that the economy is operating above potential. If unemployment is now 6%, rather than 3%, it must be that the natural rate of unemployment has increased.

If the NRH hypothesis is wrong, as I have argued here, the NK policy maker will allow the economy to operate permanently below its long-run potential and society will suffer permanent non-recoverable losses in output. 

Orthodox economics is not homogenous nor is it static. It evolves in response to historical events like the Great Depression and the 2008 Financial Crisis.  Now is a good time for all of us to be open to new ideas.