Old Keynesian Economics and Equilibrium Theory

Noah Smith refers to a vintage piece by Robert Barro that pours scorn on the New Keynesian agenda. I am grateful to Noah for drawing our attention to it. I find much to agree with in Barro’s critique of the New Keynesians and those who would attack his position would be wise to heed the proverb: those who live in glass houses should not throw stones.

Much of the modern debate between classical and Keynesian economics is framed around equilibrium theory. In the red corner is a class of reactionary equilibrium theorists who are blind to the reality of mass unemployment. In the blue corner, is a class of enlightened new Keynesians who are champions of the unemployed. These progressives recognize that nominal rigidities prevent the labor market from equating demand and supply and the obvious remedy is large-scale fiscal expansion. The failure of the reactionaries to recognize the obvious merits of this argument must be due to their political motivation.

This is a simplistic description of reality, not just because both new-Keynesian and new classical economists span both sides of the political aisle. It is also simplistic because it misunderstands the modern meaning of the equilibrium assumption. Using general equilibrium theory, broadly defined, one can build sensible equilibrium models where high unemployment exists as one of many possible labor market equilibria.

Most of the macro-economists I know, and all of the macro-economists I respect, learned a huge amount from the rational expectations revolution, initiated by Robert Lucas. Drawing on Chapter 7 of Gerard Debreu’s Theory of Value, Lucas taught us to assume that markets are always in equilibrium. That observation was a game changer that is still playing out in the research community and its implications were not, in my view, fully understood by early adopters of classical economic models.

Most modern macroeconomic theorists use dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models, DSGE, for short. These models are direct descendants of John Hicks' classic book, Value and Capital, which developed the idea that economies evolve as a series of ‘weeks’, each of which is characterized by markets that are in what Hicks called a ‘temporary equilibrium’.

After reading Keynes’ General Theory, Hicks renounced the equilibrium assumption (see Michel De Vroey) and argued instead, that for some commodities, demand may not equal supply in any given week. That ‘disequilibrium’ assumption, came to dominate the subsequent development of macroeconomics and it manifests itself today in new-Keynesian models of sticky prices.

The disequilibrium assumption favored by Hicks came under attack in the 1970s because simple models of that era could not account for the simultaneous occurrence of inflation and unemployment.

The main tool used to understand macroeconomics in 1970 was the IS-LM model. That model was widely perceived to be unsatisfactory, in part, because it is purely static. The IS-LM model does not explain the interaction of prices and expectations and, for that reason, it is an unsatisfactory model if one is interested in understanding inflation, which is an inherently dynamic process. That problem was solved by the introduction of mathematical techniques that were unavailable to previous generations of theorists. Those techniques were introduced to macroeconomics in the rational expectations revolution.

The rational expectations revolution made two changes to the temporary equilibrium agenda as it was understood in 1972. First, rational expectations theorists insisted that markets are in equilibrium every period. According to this approach, the demand equals the supply for every commodity; including labor. Second, rational expectations theorists insisted that expectations of future prices are correct in the sense that no agent is systematically fooled into making decisions that he subsequently regrets. Early versions of rational expectations models also assumed a single agent, perfect competition, linear technologies, etc., etc., etc.

These early equilibrium models, (the RBC model of Kydland and Prescott is a good example), carried with them a very strong implication. There is nothing that government can do to improve the welfare of the agents in the model. In the language of economics; these models have a unique equilibrium and that equilibrium is Pareto Optimal.1

Many economists have recognized for a long time that the RBC model of Kydland and Prescott is not a good description of the real world. Larry Summers, for example, tells us that the classical vision of economics is nonsense because it disregards some basic facts; primary among them is the existence of large-scale unemployment that persists for decades. I agree whole-heartedly. But accepting equilibrium theory as an organizing principle does not require that we accept all of the assumptions of the RBC model.

The problem with classical models is not the equilibrium assumption; it is the optimality implication. The idea that the current state of affairs is socially optimal is so obviously at odds with the existence of mass unemployment that it has given equilibrium theory a bad name. In very simple models, equilibrium and optimality are the same thing. But that conclusion is a very special implication of some equilibrium models. It does not hold in general. That idea is key to reconciling Keynesian economics with equilibrium theory.

The sceptical reader will reasonably ask how equilibrium can be consistent with unemployment. Surely the existence of unemployment requires us to assume that the demand and supply of labor are not equal to each other. Not so: By modelling the process by which unemployed workers are matched with jobs, we can use search theory (for which Dale Mortensen, Chris Pissarides and Peter Diamond were awarded the 2010 Nobel prize) to understand how unemployment varies over time.

To understand the persistence of high unemployment, we do not need to assume that prices are sticky or that markets are in disequilibrium. Mass unemployment does not occur because markets are in disequilibrium: Mass unemployment occurs because the market equilibrium is not socially optimal. Recognizing that simple fact has important implications for our understanding of the current state of the world economy.

This post would not be complete without commenting on a claim that Paul Krugman recently made on his blog in the New York Times. In Krugman’s view we should return to what he refers to as Neo-Paleo-Keynesianism which, according to Krugman, involves
…turning away from hard math back toward rough-and-ready assumptions based on empirical observation. Aspiring up-and-coming economists may be able to publish empirical papers in this vein, but theoretical analyses are likely to be met with giggles and whispers. Just because the stuff works doesn’t mean that it will be publishable.
I disagree and in a recent blog post I suggested a different definition of Neo-Paleo-Keynesianism from Krugman's initial use of that term.  In 2008 I defined a way of reconciling Keynesian economics with equilibrium theory that I called Old-Keynesian Economics. Both of these links describe ways of reconciling the essence of Old Keynesian economics with equilibrium theory that go well beyond “rough-and-ready assumptions based on empirical observation”.

The challenge for aspiring up-and-coming economists is to reconcile the observation of persistent mass unemployment with the tools of economics by building on the foundation provided by the recent work of DSGE theorists. Often, that will involve mastering ‘hard math’ because hard math offers the best way of consistently formalizing the logic that underlies economic theory. The combination of search theory with temporary equilibrium theory offers the tools to do just that. No-one would use an abacus when offered a computer. For the same reason, it would be unwise for an aspiring up-and-coming economist to cling to the static IS-LM model when there are alternative tools available that are better suited to the task of explaining financial crises.
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1. To the unsuspecting natural scientist reading this blog -- economists use the word equilibrium to mean that plans of agents are internally consistent. There is no implication in an ‘equilibrium’ that observable variables are constant through time. Instead, they are typically described by a stationary probability measure.

More on Rational Agents and Irrational Markets: A Wonkish Response to Andy Harless

In a comment on my most recent blog post, Andy Harless "[wishes he] had a better intuition for what is going on in [my] model." I took a stab at responding to Andy in the comment section, but my response became so long that I turned it into a post. Here is my answer to Andy. You can find additional comments over at Economist's View where Mark Thoma was kind enough to post an excerpt.

The model Andy is talking about (here) describes an endowment economy with no production. There are two types of people; patient and impatient. Impatient people have a higher rate of time preference than impatient people and, as a consequence, one group will become lenders and the other group will become borrowers. Both types die in any given period, with the same age-independent probability. They are replaced by new people so that the population of each type is stationary and there is an exponential age distribution for each type.

All asset market transactions occur through a zero profit financial intermediary. There are complete annuities markets and when a person dies, his wealth is returned to the financial intermediary. If a person borrows from the intermediary, he is required to take out life insurance.

In the special example in this post, there is no fundamental uncertainty. I will also assume, in this post, that there are only two shocks. Because of these special assumptions, I will need only two assets to complete the markets. These assets are short-term bonds and long-term bonds. The more general case, where long-term bonds and equity are different assets, is covered in the paper.

Short term bonds represent a claim to one unit of the endowment next period. Long term bonds represent a claim to one unit of the endowment in every period. The price of a long term bond is the same as the value of a new born agent’s human wealth because human wealth and long-bonds are claims to the same income streams.

When they are born, lenders sell a portion of their human wealth to borrowers: in return, they buy short-term debt. Lenders start out life as savers and in the early years of their life they consume less than their endowment in every period.

Borrowers, in contrast, sell sell short-term debt to lenders. In the early years of their life they consume more than their endowment in every period.

As lenders age, eventually they reap the benefits of their youthful choices and they begin to spend the interest on their asset portfolios. Lenders have an increasing consumption profile over time.

As borrowers age, eventually they reap the harvest of their youthful indiscretion and they begin to pay back the interest on their debts. Borrowers have a decreasing consumption profile over time.

So far so good. But what about uncertainty?

The trades I described above imply that a lender shorts long-term debt and goes long in short-term debt. A borrower takes the opposite side of these trades.

A long bond issued in period t is a claim to one unit of the endowment next period PLUS a claim to a long bond in period t+1. Just as in Keynes’ beauty contest example, the price of a long bond next period is worth what the market thinks it is worth. In the paper, we assume that there is a complete set of markets that are indexed to an observable ‘sunspot’ variable. That is simply a short cut for bringing ‘animal spirits’ or market sentiment into the pricing equation. The model displays what George Soros calls ‘reflexivity’.

Our model has many equilibria where a long-bond is worth exactly what the market thinks it is worth. If people think that long bonds are worth a lot; they WILL BE worth a lot. In that case, there will be a resource transfer from lenders to the new born agents and the borrowers. If people think that long bonds are worth less; they WILL BE worth less. In that case, there will be a resource transfer from the new born agents and the borrowers to the lenders.

Our model differs from a representative agent economy because, although borrowers and lenders each make trades that obey a transversality condition, there is no analog of these transversality conditions for the market as a whole. It is this feature that distinguishes our work from most other models. The trades that occur in our model are equilibrium trades in the sense in which that term is used in standard DSGE models.  But unlike most existing models; these trades are NOT Pareto optimal. We think that this is a useful way to understand why financial crises are so painful.

Why are equilibria not Pareto optimal? The answer comes from our assumption that demographics limit participation. If the unborn could participate in the asset markets that occur before they are born, they would eliminate the inefficient sunspot fluctuations. Because everyone is assumed to dislike risk, in the absence of prenatal financial markets; everyone is worse off. The model captures a lot of what appears to have happened in the financial markets, within a framework that is very neoclassical in its structure. For me, that is a virtue.

Rational Agents: Irrational Markets

Bob Shiller wrote an interesting piece in today's NY Times on the irrationality of human action. Shiller argues that the economist's conception of human beings as rational is hard to square with the behavior of asset markets.

Although I agree with Shiller, that human action is inadequately captured by the assumptions that most economists make about behavior, I am not convinced that we need to go much beyond the rationality assumption, to understand what causes financial crises or why they are so devastatingly painful for large numbers of people. The assumption that agents maximize utility can get us a very very long way.


I am going to stake out a position that Amartya Sen, in his lovely article on rational fools, ascribes to Edgeworth in his book, Mathematical Psychics: namely, that agents are rational in a narrowly defined sense. I am willing to make that assumption because, as I will argue, the financial markets would go very badly wrong most of the time even if agents were fully rational in the sense in which economists define rationality.

Edgeworth introduced what he called his first principle of economics which is that "every agent is actuated only by self interest." As Sen points out, Edgeworth was not naive enough to think that people behave exactly in the way he portrays them. In Sens's words,
... Edgeworth himself was quite aware that [his] first principle of Economics was not a particularly realistic one. Indeed, he felt that "the concrete nineteenth century man is for the most part an impure egoist, a mixed utilitarian." This raises the interesting question as to why Edgeworth spent so much of his time and talent in developing a line of inquiry the first principle of which he believed to be false.
Sen goes on to provide an answer to his own question, arguing that
Edgeworth, did not think the assumption to be fundamentally mistaken in the particular types of activities to which he applied what he called "economical calculus": (i) war and (ii) contract.
Like Edgeworth, I believe that the rationality assumption is useful to describe much of economic behavior. Unlike Shiller, I do not think we need to move beyond that assumption to explain asset market fluctuations.

In my own work, I have shown that the labor market can go very badly wrong even when everybody is rational.  My coauthors and I showed in a recent paper, that the same idea holds in financial markets. Even when individuals are assumed to be rational; the financial markets may function very badly.1

In my coauthored paper, we describe a world populated by rational utility maximizers. We make only two, reasonable, changes to the representative agent model. We allow for two kinds of agents instead of one, and unlike the standard model, our agents do not live forever; they are born and they die. Those assumptions turn out to be sufficient to cause huge inefficient swings in asset prices. Asset market fluctuations occur because agents are unable to insure against the state of the world into which they are born.

Figure 1: The Invariant Distribution of Human Wealth

Figure 1 is a plot, taken from the paper, that shows the distribution of the expected value of the earnings of a new born person. The figure illustrates the differing lifetime opportunities of being born into a boom or a recession. And since human wealth and stock market wealth move together in our model, the picture also illustrates the range of values that can be taken by the price earnings ratio.

Miles Kimball and I have both been arguing that stock market fluctuations are inefficient and we both think that government should act to stabilize the asset markets. Miles' position is much closer to that of Bob Shiller; he thinks that agents are not always rational in the sense of Edgeworth. Miles and Bob may well be right. But in my view, the argument for stabilizing asset markets is much stronger. Even if we accept that agents are rational, it does not follow that swings in asset prices are Pareto efficient. But whether the motive arises from irrational people, or irrational markets; Miles and I agree: We can, and should, design an institution that takes advantage of the government's ability to trade on behalf of the unborn. More on that in a future post.

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1. Roger E. A. Farmer, Carine Nourry and Alain Venditti, "The Inefficient Markets Hypothesis; Why Financial Markets do not Work Well in the Real World. "NBER working paper 18647

Congratulations Harold

My colleague Harold Demsetz was honored this year, along with Stanley Fischer, Jerry Hausman and Paul Joskow, as a Distinguished Fellow of the American Economics Association. Congratulations to all!  Here is what the AEA said about Harold.

Harold Demsetz

Harold Demsetz is one of the most creative and deep microeconomists of the 20th century.  Several of his contributions anticipated subsequent research by years or even decades, and have offered unusually insightful analyses of fundamental problems of economic theory.

Demsetz’s most famous paper “Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization” (with Armen Alchian, American Economic Review 1972) is one of the most cited papers in all of economics. It analyzes the fundamental question first raised by Coase, “What is a firm?” and tries to understand the difference between contracts occurring inside the firm (for example, with employees) and those occurring in the market (for example, with customers).  Alchian and Demsetz argue that some contracts are efficiently brought inside the firm because doing so reduces the costs of monitoring of performance, especially when production occurs in teams.  Alchian and Demsetz’s approach has been challenged by more recent developments, such as Grossman and Hart (1986), but remains a classic in the theory of the firm.

In 1968, Demsetz asked the question, “Why regulate utilities?” and argued that it is more efficient to get potential suppliers to compete in prices and terms by offering customers contracts than to control prices. Demsetz’s framing of the problem has become the dominant approach to the modern theory of regulation, see for example, Laffont and Tirole (1993).

In the same year, Demsetz published “The Cost of Transacting” in the Quarterly Journal of Economics, which raised fundamental questions about the determinants of transaction costs, and empirically documented the negative relationship between transaction costs and trading volume on different stocks on the New York Stock Exchange. The enormous subfield of finance now known as market microstructure begins with this hugely original article.

In 1967, Demsetz published a short but tremendously insightful article in the American Economic Review, called “Toward a Theory of Property Rights,” in which he analyzed the amount of property rights protection from the efficiency perspective.  The article argued that property rights are expensive to enforce, and that institutions enforcing them arise efficiently when the benefit of secure property rights outweigh the costs of these institutions. Today, the economic study of institutions is a massive field, and Demsetz’s article can be justly seen as a founding contribution.

In 1985, together with Kenneth Lehn, Demsetz published an empirical article in the Journal of Political Economy, called “The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and Consequences.”  In that article, the authors document high ownership concentration of US firms in some sectors, such as newspapers and sports teams, and argue that the amenity potential of running these businesses (now known as “private benefits of control”) explains ownership concentration. In modern corporate finance, concentrated corporate ownership is seen as a norm rather than an exception, and private benefits of control as central determinants of ownership structures. Here again, Demsetz’s work came early, and accurately grasped both the empirical reality and the fundamental theoretical issues.

The number of areas in which Harold Demsetz’s contributions have stood the test of time is remarkable.  His work is highly original, independent of prevailing intellectual currents, and enduring.

History Matters

I was planning to take a break from blogging today but then I came across Chris House's homily to his students encouraging them not to read the General Theory; or, for that matter, anything else written in economics BME (before the Mankiw era). I simply cannot let that exhortation stand without adding a few words in defense of the history of thought and in support of Scott Sumner's  take on Chris' post.

I've given quite a few public lectures over the last several years to promote economic literacy and to publicize my book, How the Economy Works.  In those talks, I was often asked if I think that economics is a science. My answer is yes; but it's not an experimental science. The research task of a group of economists is similar to that of a team of research chemists, presented with an unknown substance and asked to identify it, subject to two constraints.  1) the team is allowed to conduct at most three experiments a century and 2) they are not allowed to read the research notes of their predecessors.

A knowledge of economic history is equivalent to a knowledge of the outcome of the chemistry experiments; a knowledge of the writings of our predecessors is equivalent to reading the research notes written at the time.

Chris tells his students not to read the classics. I tell my students something very different.  Be skeptical of everything you're taught.  Think through a problem before you read the literature; then go read  what other people had to say.  By thinking out the problem first you are more likely to understand why the literature moved in the way it did.  And don't stop reading with whats on the reading list for your latest course. It often pays to dig back a bit further; sometimes a lot further.

When you tackle hard problems, and that's pretty much everything in macro, it pays to read what very smart people before you had to say about those problems. Read Hicks' Value and Capital.  Read Patinkin's  Money Interest and Prices. Read Hayek on The Constitution of Liberty.  And YES read Keynes' General Theory.